Mercer Law Review
Volume 67
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 5

12-2015

Construction Law
Frank O. Brown Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Construction Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Brown, Frank O. Jr. (2015) "Construction Law," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 67 : No. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol67/iss1/5

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Construction Law

by Frank 0. Brown, Jr.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article focuses on noteworthy opinions by Georgia appellate
courts between June 1, 2014 and May 31, 2015 relevant to the practice
of construction law.'
II.

MECHANICS' AND MATERIALMEN'S LIENS AND SLANDER TO TITLE

The Georgia Court of Appeals in Seaboard Construction Co. v. Kent

Realty Brunswick, LLC 2 addressed section 44-14-361.1(e) of the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), 3 part of the mechanics' and
materialmen's lien law. That subsection provides, "In no event shall the
aggregate amount of liens set up by Code Section 44-14-361 exceed the
contract price of the improvements made or services performed."'
Harbor Development, LP (Harbor) was developing a 135-acre parcel
for residential lots and condominiums. Harbor entered into a contract
with Seaboard Construction Co. (Seaboard) to perform site preparation
work on Phase I of that parcel. Seaboard received $6,261,192.52. A
dispute arose concerning the remaining $326,661.50 under the contract.
Seaboard then filed five mechanics' and materialmen's liens, each in the
amount of the remaining $326,661.50. Two of the liens were filed
against property in the development owned by Kent Realty Brunswick,
LLC (Kent). One of the Kent properties was in Phase I, the other in

* Shareholder in the firm of Weissman, Nowack, Curry & Wilco, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia.
General Counsel for Greater Atlanta Home Builders Association, Inc. Rhodes College (B.A.,
1976); Emory University School of Law (J.D., 1979). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Georgia construction law during the prior survey period, see
Frank 0. Brown, Jr., ConstructionLaw, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 66 MERCER L. REV.
27 (2014).
2. 331 Ga. App. 742, 771 S.E.2d 429 (2015).
3. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(e) (2002).
4. Id.
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Phase II. Thus, the aggregate amount of the liens against the Kent
properties was $727,919.62, and the aggregate amount of liens against
all five properties was $1,819,799.05."
Kent filed suit against Seaboard for slander to title, and Seaboard
counterclaimed to foreclose the liens. The trial court granted Kent's
motion for summary judgment on the lien foreclosure claims after
concluding the liens were excessive under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(e),
which is quoted above. The trial court denied Seaboard's motion for
summary judgment on Kent's slander to title claim because it found
there were jury issues about it.6
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary
judgment to Kent on the lien foreclosure claims, reasoning that they
were invalid under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(e). In doing so, the court
effectively interpreted "the contract price" in O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(e)
as meaning the remaining unpaid amount of the contract price owed for
work on Kent's properties. 8 The court of appeals reversed the trial
court's denial of summary judgment to Seaboard on Kent's slander to
title claim, reasoning that Kent failed to prove any special damages
required for such a claim.' The court rejected Kent's contention that the
attorney fees it incurred in defending Seaboard's lien foreclosure claims
were special damages."o
In Hill v. VNS Corp.," a contractor failed to pay a supplier for
materials purchased for a home. The supplier filed a mechanics' and
materialmen's lien against the home and then filed a suit against the
contractor and its personal guarantor (contractor defendants) on the debt
and against the homeowner to enforce its lien. The trial court granted
a default judgment against the contractor defendants because they did
not answer the suit. In addition to the principal debt, the judgment
included attorney fees and pre-judgment interest.12
Thereafter, the contractor defendants paid about two-thirds of the
judgment amount. In response, the supplier reduced its lien claim
against the home, but not by the full payment. The supplier contended
that part of that payment was appropriately allocated to attorney fees
and pre-judgment interest owed by the personal guarantor, and,

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Seaboard, 331 Ga. App. at 742-43, 771 S.E.2d at 430-31.
Id. at 742-43, 771 S.E.2d at 430.
Id. at 743-44, 771 S.E.2d at 431.
Id. at 743-44, 771 S.E.2d at 430-31.
Id. at 744, 771 S.E.2d at 431.
Id. at 745, 771 S.E.2d at 431.
329 Ga. App. 274, 764 S.E.2d 876 (2014).
Id. at 274-75, 764 S.E.2d at 877-78.
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therefore, that part did not reduce the amount of the lien. The trial
court granted the supplier's motion for summary judgment against the
homeowner on the reduced amount of the lien, plus pre-judgment
interest on that amount. The homeowner appealed."
The court of appeals stated that the supplier had the burden of
proving the lien amount by producing evidence of lienable items included
in the default judgment against the contractor defendants." The court
reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that there was an
issue of fact about the amount of the lien because of conflicting
affidavits.'" Additionally, the court held the homeowner was entitled
to credit against the lien for the full post-default judgment amount paid
by the contractor defendants to the supplier, and that the supplier could
not reduce that credit for either attorney fees, since they were not a
lienable item, or re-judgment interest owed by the contractor, because
it was not lienable as a result of not being liquidated. 6 Finally, the
court held the supplier was not entitled to pre-judgment interest for the
amount of the actual lien because it also was not liquidated."
III.

REPRESENTATIVE'S PERSONAL CONTRACT LIABILITY

In Progressive Electric Services, Inc. v. Task Force Construction,
Inc.,1" the general contractor, Task Force Construction, Inc. (TFC), sued
a subcontractor, Progressive Electrical Services, Inc. (Progressive), and
the subcontractor's president for breach of contract and indemnification
for payments made by TFC to its surety for reimbursements the surety
paid to settle a claim by Progressive's supplier. The trial court entered
summary judgment in favor of TFC against Progressive and its
president."9
The key issue on appeal was whether the president was individually
liable for the debt.2 o In affirming the trial court, the court of appeals
stated that, although the president had "ostensibly" signed its contract
with TFC in a representative, rather than individual, capacity, the
contract contained a provision stating that:
Signing Individual ....

Each and every individual signing on behalf

of [Progressive] also further agrees that, notwithstanding anything

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 275, 764 S.E.2d at 878.
Id. at 276, 764 S.E.2d at 878.
Id. at 276-77, 764 S.E.2d at 879.
Id. at 277, 764 S.E.2d at 879.
Id.
327 Ga. App. 608, 760 S.E.2d 621 (2014).
Id. at 608-09, 760 S.E.2d at 623.
Id. at 611, 760 S.E.2d at 624.
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contained herein or on any signature line to the contrary, each such
individual signing on behalf of [Progressive], in addition to signing in
a representative capacity, is also signing [the Agreement] in his or her
personal and individualcapacity and each such individual signing on
behalf of [Progressive], by signing below, hereby individually and
personally agrees to be bound by all of the obligations of [Progressive]
in [the Agreement] (including, but not limited to, the Attachments
hereto).2 1

The court held that this language bound the president individually.2 2
Additionally, the court rejected the president's argument that this
language merely created a guaranty and was unenforceable for other

reasons. 23 The "Signing Individual" provision of the contract is a good
provision to consider including in a contract if your client might benefit
from it, but it is also a very bad provision to agree to if your client's
representative will be obligated by it.
IV

THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY AND NEGLIGENT CONSTRUCTION

Jai Ganesh Lodging, Inc. v. David M. Smith, Inc24 arose from
settlement-related structural damage to a newly constructed hotel. The
franchisee of the hotel and the owner of the land on which the hotel is
located sued the grading contractor, grading subcontractor, and two
individuals associated with the grading subcontractor. Their claims
included breach of contract and negligent construction. After withdraw-

ing its earlier order allowing the addition of the two individuals as
defendants, the trial court granted summary judgment to the general

contractor and subcontractor. The plaintiffs appealed.2 5
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary
judgment relating to the breach of contract claim, finding the plaintiffs
were not third-party beneficiaries of the grading subcontract even
though they were, in fact, the property owner and hotel franchisee.26

The court based that finding on several facts.27 First, neither plaintiff
was a party to the general contract, which was instead between the

general contractor and the property owner, Anil Patel, who the general
contract and subcontract referred to as the owner and developer."

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 609, 760 S.E.2d at 623 (emphasis supplied by court).
Id. at 612, 760 S.E.2d at 625.
Id. at 612-13, 760 S.E.2d at 625.
328 Ga. App. 713, 760 S.E.2d 718 (2014).
Id. at 713-14, 760 S.E.2d at 720-21.
Id. at 713, 719, 760 S.E.2d at 720, 723.
Id.
Id. at 719, 760 S.E.2d at 723.
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Second, neither the general contract nor subcontract mentioned the
plaintiffs. 2 9 Thus, the court reasoned that neither the general contractor nor the subcontractor intended to benefit the plaintiffs' undisclosed
corporate entities, which were the actual owners of the land and the
franchisee.30 Next, the court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs' negligent construction
claims, reasoning that the trial court erroneously concluded that privity
of contract was a prerequisite to that claim." The court stated that
privity is unnecessary when a negligence claim arises from a duty
imposed by law and not from a contractual duty.3 2
V. QUANTUM MERUIT
In One Bluff Drive, LLC v. KA.P, Inc.," a homeowner contracted
with a general contractor to construct improvements to a residence.
Thereafter, the homeowner significantly revised the scope of the project.
In response, the contractor gave the homeowner an estimate for the
additional work. The estimate did not include any contractual terms.
After receiving that estimate, the homeowner made further changes to
the project. When the homeowner failed to pay amounts claimed by the
contractor, the latter sued. The jury returned a large award against the
homeowner, which included attorney fees for bad faith."
On appeal, the homeowner argued that the trial court erred by
charging the jury on the law of quantum meruit because the contractor
never raised a claim under that theory and needed to plead quantum
meruit in a separate count." The court of appeals held that it was
unnecessary for the contractor to set forth a quantum meruit claim in a
separate count and, furthermore, to even specifically allege a quantum
meruit cause of action since the complaint prayed for relief and
presented evidence to support that claim.
VI.

UNJUST ENRICHMENT

First Bank of Georgia v. Robertson Grading, Inc." stands as a firm
reminder that a contractor generally cannot make claims against the

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 718, 760 S.E.2d at 723.
Id. at 718-19, 760 S.E.2d at 723.
Id. at 720, 760 S.E.2d at 724.
Id. at 719-20, 760 S.E.2d at 723-24.
330 Ga. App. 45, 766 S.E.2d 508 (2014).
Id. at 45-46, 766 S.E.2d at 510-11; see also O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 (2010).
One Bluff Drive, LLC, 330 Ga. App. at 47, 766 S.E.2d at 511.
Id. at 48-49, 766 S.E.2d at 512-13.
328 Ga. App. 236, 761 S.E.2d 628 (2014).
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owner's lender even though the contractor's work greatly increases the
value of the secured property, which, as a result, benefits the lender. In
this case, a paving contractor asserted a number of causes of action
against a lender that foreclosed on property that included the contractor's paving work. One of the claims was for unjust enrichment. A jury
rendered a significant verdict for the contractor partly because of the
lender's significant profit from the post-foreclosure resale of the project,
which profit was partly possible because of the paving work. The lender
appealed, arguing the trial court should have granted its directed verdict
on all claims.
The Georgia Court of Appeals agreed with the lender.3 9 The court
held that the contractor did not have an unjust enrichment claim
because the Georgia mechanics' and materialmen's lien statute provided
the contractor's sole remedy, and since the lender had the right to
foreclose, it had not received any unjust enrichment.4 0 The court also
rejected the contractor's promissory estoppel and negligent misrepresentation claims, which were based on statements allegedly made by the
lender about paying the contractor.4
VII.

SURETY RIGHTS AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

In State Department of Correctionsv. Developers Surety & Indemnity
Co.,4 the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDOC) contracted with
a roofing contractor to re-roof several buildings at a state prison. As a
condition to the contract with GDOC, the contractor received payment
and performance bonds. Thereafter, GDOC declared the contractor in
default for delays on completing the project. Prior to that declaration,
the surety on the bonds provided financial assistance to the contractor
under the bonds. After the declaration, the surety incurred additional
costs from investigating its liability under the bonds. Following the
investigation, the surety, as subrogee for the contractor, sued GDOC for
breach of contract and for a declaratory judgment that it had no duty
under the bonds. GDOC counterclaimed for breach of contract. On
cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court entered judgment
for the surety. GDOC appealed, and the Georgia Court of Appeals
affirmed."

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 236, 761 S.E.2d at 630-31.
Id. at 236, 761 S.E.2d at 631.
Id. at 247-48, 761 S.E.2d at 638-39.
Id. at 245-46, 761 S.E.2d at 637.
295 Ga. 741, 763 S.E.2d 868 (2014).
Id. at 741-44, 763 S.E.2d at 869-71.
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The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari." The matter of "first
impression" before the Georgia Supreme Court was whether the surety,
as subrogee of the contractor, could rely on GDOC's waiver of sovereign
immunity for breach of contract claims.4 5 In a unanimous decision, the
court held that the surety could rely on that waiver.4 6
VIII.

GOVERNMENT PAYMENT BONDS AND ALTERNATIVE CLAIMS

In City of College Park v. Sekisui SPR Americas, LLC,"' a subcontractor on a city sewer project sued the city after the general contractor
failed to pay the subcontractor. The subcontractor contended that the
city was liable for the unpaid amounts because it failed to assure that
the general contractor had a payment bond. In the alternative, the
subcontractor asserted quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and an
implied duty to pay claims. After the trial court granted the subcontractor's motion for summary judgment, the city appealed."
The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the city was excused from
liability otherwise imposed by O.C.G.A. § 36-91-91" for the absence
of a payment bond because the sewer project was an emergency and,
therefore, the exception allowed by O.C.G.A. § 36-91-22(e)"o applied."
Additionally, the court held that the subcontractor could not pursue
quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, or an implied duty to pay claims
against the city because, under Georgia law, those claims do not exist
against an owner or general contractor with whom the subcontractor has
no contract.5 2 Instead, the subcontractor's sole remedies in this context
were for a payment bond, which did not exist, and for funds owed by the
city to the general contractor, which also did not exist because the city
had paid all amounts owed."
IX.

RESCISSION

Legacy Academy, Inc. v. Mamilove, LLC5 4 was not a construction
case, but the court addressed fraud and rescission claims, which often

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 741, 763 S.E.2d at 869.
Id. at 742 n.2, 744, 763 S.E.2d at 870 n.2, 871.
Id. at 747, 763 S.E.2d at 873.
331 Ga. App. 404, 771 S.E.2d 101 (2015).
Id. at 404-05, 771 S.E.2d at 102-03.
O.C.G.A. § 36-91-91 (2012).
O.C.G.A. § 36-91-22(e) (2012).
College Park, 331 Ga. App. at 408-09, 771 S.E.2d at 104-05.
Id. at 409, 771 S.E.2d at 105.
Id. at 409-10, 771 S.E.2d at 105.
297 Ga. 15, 771 S.E.2d 868 (2015).
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arise in the sale of residences by contractor and sellers. This case
stemmed from the purchase of a daycare franchise. The plaintiffs were
the purchaser and its officers. The defendants were the seller and its
related officers. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants fraudulently
induced them to sign the purchase agreement by providing false
information about the historical earnings of existing franchisees. A jury
found in favor of the plaintiffs, and the Georgia Court of Appeals
affirmed."
On certiorari to the Georgia Supreme Court, a key issue was whether
the plaintiffs could rely on the alleged misrepresentations underlying
their rescission and fraud claims when the purchase agreement made no
such representations.5 6 The court held that the plaintiffs could not rely
on the alleged misrepresentations, reasoning that those statements
directly contradicted the terms of an agreement and, therefore, could not
be the grounds for rescission based on fraud because the plaintiffs could
read the contract.5 7

Another key issue before the supreme court was whether the plaintiffs
were excused from reading the purchase agreement, which they admitted
they had not done." They contended they were excused from reading
the agreement because the defendants rushed them into signing it by
representing, on the same day as presenting the contract, that they
would lose the franchise if they did not sign that day." The supreme
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument as a sufficient excuse.o
A third issue was whether the merger clause in the purchase contract
barred the plaintiff's fraud claims. 6 ' The court held that it did because,
as noted above, the plaintiffs were not entitled to rescind the agreement
and were, therefore, bound by its provisions, including the merger
clause.62
This case serves as an important reminder that many civil actions are
won at the contract drafting stage and that affirmative disclaimers and
merger clauses importantly function as defensive tools and contain terms
that purchasers can carefully read and modify, if appropriate, to reflect
the actual pre-contract representations.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

15, 15-16, 771 S.E.2d at 869, 869-70.
18, 771 S.E.2d at 871.
17, 771 S.E.2d at 870-71.
17-19, 771 S.E.2d at 871-72.
17-18, 771 S.E.2d at 871.
19, 771 S.E.2d at 872.
20, 771 S.E.2d at 872.

